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8.1  Introduction and Overview 
This paper develops unique disaggregated data to assess how changes 
in exchange rates, factor costs, and voluntary export restraints have 
affected recent price competitiveness in the U.S.  passenger car market. 
The changes share a common feature. Each alters the relationship of 
the auto sector’s prices abroad to those at home. This would seem in 
turn to influence various measures of  competitiveness in predictable 
ways; indeed that is one of the principal purposes of sectoral policies 
like voluntary export restraints.  Such sectoral policies also alter the 
relationship of the auto sector’s prices to prices of other goods. 
I find support for several familiar relationships. The support provided 
by  the experience of  the late  1970s is  straightforward. The dollar’s 
foreign-exchange value fell below its historical trend, in both nominal 
and cost-adjusted (real) terms, relative to the major suppliers of U.S. 
auto imports.  U.S. price competitiveness tracked US.  cost competi- 
tiveness quite closely, as average prices of U.S. automakers rose more 
slowly than those of their principal rival firms (all Japanese). Misalign- 
ment of the dollar toward weakness by historical norms was reflected 
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in competitive relative pricing by U.S. auto firms, again with respect 
to a historical norm. 
The support provided by the experience of the years 1980-85 is more 
complex and interesting. Relative to major auto suppliers, the effective 
nominal dollar rose gradually toward its level of the mid-1970s, but the 
effective real “auto dollar” rose much faster, increasing to a level well 
above its  historical  norm  by  early  1985. U.S.  cost competitiveness 
deteriorated, not so much because of exchange rates, but because unit 
labor costs in manufacturing rose in the United States relative to those 
in major auto suppliers. U.S. auto price competitiveness began to de- 
teriorate correspondingly, but soon stopped and instead improved grad- 
ually between  1982 and 1985.  The Voluntary Restraint Arrangements 
(VRAs) with Japan, which began in  1981,  seem to be the explanation 
for why the negative effects of exchange rates and costs on U.S. auto 
price competitiveness were swamped between 1982  and 1985.  Average 
prices of U.S. automakers in fact rose more slowly than those of Jap- 
anese rival firms over this period, but they rose faster than other U.S. 
prices  as measured by the consumer price index. In Japan, average 
prices on auto sales to the United States rose much faster than other 
Japanese prices. 
“Offsetting strong forces”  seems the best phrase for summarizing 
U.S. auto price competitiveness in the early 1980s.  Average prices of 
U.S. automakers were at about the same level relative to Japanese 
rivals in  1985 as in  1980.  Misalignment of the dollar toward strength 
by  historical norms, and deteriorating labor cost competitiveness, which 
tended to undermine the competitiveness of U.S. auto firms, were offset 
by the Japanese VRAs, which buttressed it. 
To  arrive at these  conclusions,  I  compiled  a unique  data  set for 
effective exchange rates relevant to auto trade and for three U.S. au- 
tomakers and three Japanese. The data were aggregated in ways suit- 
able to detecting the  influence of  exchange rates, factor costs, and 
voluntary  export  restraints.  Existing  auto data,  although  abundant, 
were unsuitable for my purposes-inadequately  disaggregated or in- 
appropriately (even peculiarly) aggregated. 
8.2  Inadequacies in Existing Data 
Studies of recent U.S.  auto trade encounter a number of data prob- 
lems.’ Lack of data is not one. There is a veritable car-nucopia of facts 
and figures. Yet not many are in a format suitable for empirical analysis. 
There are at least four important difficulties, each of which is addressed 
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8.2.1 
Most researchers are confident that exchange rates have had some 
important  influence on recent  U.S. auto trade.  Those who have at- 
tempted to estimate it have generally employed bilateral  rates (e.g., 
between  yen  and dollars) or measures of overall effective exchange 
rates-based  on aggregate trade dependence in all produck2  Over most 
of  the  1970s  and  1980s,  however, more than  90% of  U.S.  trade  in 
passenger cars has involved just three trading partners: Canada, Ger- 
many,  and Japan.  An  attempt  is  made  below  to compute effective 
exchange rates for these three suppliers and Britain that are appropriate 
for U.S.  passenger car imports. Some surprising insights emerge. 
8.2.2  Lack of Suitable Disaggregation 
Some of the most readily accessible series on autos lump all domestic 
suppliers together, and their counterparts for US.  auto imports lump 
all foreign suppliers together. This causes difficulties in several ways. 
First, exchange rates among the various import suppliers have moved 
quite differently over the past 15 years. Second, during the 1980s U.S. 
imports from Japan were restrained, and the effects of such discrimi- 
natory restraints on aggregate data may be hard to detect if  imports 
from Canada or Europe expanded through trade diversion (see Dino- 
poulos and Kreinin 1987). Third, the United States and Canada produce 
virtually identical passenger cars, and intracorporate trade is free of 
border restraint; for some purposes, it may be better to count net auto 
imports from Canada as part of the U.S.  auto sector rather than as 
shipments from abroad. Fourth, firm-by-firm competitiveness is inter- 
esting in its own right: General Motors (GM) and Honda may be more 
sheltered than other firms from exchange rates because of  their global 
diversification.  Disaggregation along all  these  lines is begun  below, 
again with some surprising insights. 
8.2.3  Inadequate Price Indexes 
A number of  price indexes for autos exist, yet some of the indexes 
mix together domestic and imported auto prices, and some mix together 
new and used car prices. Other indexes are relative newcomers, and 
many of the indexes are incestuously related to each other.3 A first- 
pass  attempt  is made  below to construct several price indexes that 
would be helpful for empirically assessing the impact of  trade policy 
and exchange rates on the U.S. auto market. 
8.2.4  Inadequate Measures of “Real”  Variables 
Some “real”  variables that are available are untrustworthy princi- 
pally because of the inadequate price indexe~.~  Other real data embody 
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a surprising tolerance for simply adding up numbers of autos produced 
and imported, as if  relative prices of foreign and domestic cars, large 
and small cars, stripped-down  and spruced-up cars were always the 
same. An attempt is made below to recompute several important real 
variables for the auto sector as a natural extension of  having recom- 
puted the price indexes. 
8.3  Effective Exchange Rates for U.S. Passenger Automobiles 
Central to any assessment of how exchange rates affect U.S. auto 
competitiveness are measures of what is meant by “exchange rates” 
and “competitiveness.” This section evaluates alternative measures of 
effective exchange rates for passenger automobiles in the U.S. market 
and one measure of U.S. auto cost competitiveness, comparing them 
to their counterparts for overall trade. Section 8.4 examines alternative 
measures of the price competitiveness of  U.S. automakers and their 
Canadian affiliates relative to Japanese automakers and their U.S. af- 
filiates and assesses their covariation with the auto exchange rates 
calculated below. 
Figures 8.1 through 8.5 record six alternative measures of effective 
nominal auto exchange rates for the United States since 1974, computed 
Fig. 8.1  Effective  Exchange  Value of  the  U.S.  Dollar  Overall  and 
Two Measures of the Effective Nominal Auto Dollar: 1972- 
76  Weighted  (Laspeyres)  Indexes.  = Overall  Dollar; 
= Auto  Dollar  with  Canada;  A = Auto  Dollar  without 
Canada; 100 = March 1973. 219  Exchange Rates and U.S. Auto Competitiveness 
Fig. 8.2  Effective Nominal Auto Dollar with and without Canada: 1980 
I, I1 Weighted (Laspeyres) Indexes.  A  = Auto Dollar with 
Canada:  = Auto  Dollar without  Canada; 100 =  March, 
1973. 
5.4 
Fig. 8.3  Effective Nominal Auto  Dollar with and  without Canada: 
Current-Weight (Paasche)  Indexes.  A  = Auto  Dollar  with 
Canada; D = Auto  Dollar without  Canada; 100 = March, 
1973. 220  J ,  David Richardson 
Fig. 8.4  Effective Nominal  Auto  Dollar with  Canada:  Alternative 
Weights.  = 1972-76  Weighted (Laspeyres) Indexes;  = 
1980 I, I1 Weighted (Laspeyres) Indexes; A = Current-Weight 
(Paasche) Indexes; 100 = March 1973. 
Fig. 8.5  Effective Nominal Auto Dollar without Canada: Alternative 
Weights.  = 1972-76  Weighted  (Laspeyres)  Indexes; 
= 1980 I, I1 Weighted (Laspeyres) Indexes; A = Current 
Weight (Paasche) Indexes; 100 = March 1973. 221  Exchange Rates and U.S. Auto Competitiveness 
quarterly. Figure 8.6 compares one of these to a labor-cost-adjusted 
(“real”)  measure of  auto exchange rates.  An  “effective”  exchange 
rate is a weighted average of bilateral exchange rates, where the weights 
often reflect trading-partner transaction shares. In all tables the weights 
are the value shares of total U.S.  passenger car imports accounted for 
by Britain, Germany, and Japan, with and without Canada.5 Bilateral 
exchange rates are expressed as index numbers of the strength (price) 
of the “auto dollar,” with March 1973  = 100. 
These series for the auto dollar are arguably broader measures of 
exchange rate pressures on U.S. auto manufacturing than the bilateral 
exchange rates used in other research.  Effective exchange rates like 
these for other sectors have also been  calculated recently by Arndt 
(1986), Belongia (1986), Clifton (1989, Dutton  and Grennes (1983, 
Hartman (1986), and Marston (1986). 
The first important question in  calculating a measure of  the auto 
dollar is whether the Canadian dollar should be included or excluded. 
In principle,  the answer depends on the purpose  of the calculation. 
Inclusion seems advisable for purposes of assessing the impact of ex- 
change rates on U.S.  geographical variables such as auto employment. 
Fig. 8.6  Effective Real  and Nominal Auto  Dollar without Canada. 
= Nominal,  1972-76  Weighted  (Laspeyres)  Index  from 
Figures 8.1 and 8.5;  0  = Real  = Nominal Index Adjusted for 
Manufacturing Unit Labor Costs in  U.S. and  Rival  Auto- 
making Countries,  Using Same Weights and Base; 100  = 
March 1973. 222  J. David Richardson 
Exclusion seems advisable for purposes  of  assessing the  impact of 
exchange rates on U.S. corporate variables such as Chrysler Corpo- 
ration market share-Chrysler  is free to trade across the U.S.-Canadian 
border  without  barriers.  Inclusion  or exclusion of  Canada makes a 
significant difference in measuring the exchange value of the auto dollar. 
Two issues that turn out to make much less difference are whether the 
effective exchange rate index should be fixed weight or current weight, 
and whether fixed weights should represent trade shares from distant 
periods or from recent periods.6 
Figures 8.1, 8.2, and 8.3 reveal the effect of  Canada’s inclusion or 
exclusion for alternative weighting schemes. Figures 8.1 and 8.2 differ 
from figure 8.3 in  displaying fixed-weight indexes. One set of  fixed 
weights represents average value shares of U.S. passenger car imports 
over the period 1972-76.  These weights were chosen to make the auto 
indexes as comparable as possible to the Federal Reserve System’s 
index of the overall weighted-average value of the U.S. dollar, based 
on 1972-76 global trade of the Group of Ten countries plus Switzerland. 
This aggregate index is plotted in figure 8.1 for reference, is also equal 
to 100 in March 1973, and is published monthly in the Federal  Reserve 
Bulletin.’ The other set of fixed weights represents average value shares 
of U.S. passenger car imports over the first two quarters of 1980. These 
weights were chosen because the period from late 1979 to late 1980 is 
often thought to represent a watershed in a number of ways for both 
auto trade and global economic trends.8 Figure 8.3 differs from figures 
8.1 and 8.2 in displaying current-weight indexes. Each period’s set of 
bilateral exchange rate indexes is weighted by that period’s value shares 
of trade. In general, the choices of weighting system and of base year 
for the fixed weights make very little difference to the effective value 
of the auto dollar. This can also be seen in either figure 8.4 or figure 
8.5, where the alternative time trajectories for the effective auto dollar 
are packed tightly t~gether.~ 
Excluding Canada makes a significant difference. The U.S. dollar 
was much weaker during most of the period in its command over non- 
Canadian autos than in its command over Canadian autos (which are, 
of course, usually identical to U.S. manufactured models). This finding 
arises, naturally, from the general weakening of the Canadian dollar, 
but its implications for U.S. auto competitiveness need emphasis. The 
exchange rate between the U.S. and Canadian dollar since the mid- 
1970s has worked against  U.S. geographical competitiveness in auto 
production. One can interpret the gap between the trajectories in figures 
8.2 and 8.3 as one component of a Canadian competitiveness edge in 
autos, which developed in the late 1970s and which has been more-or- 
less stable since then. This edge may have little impact on the global 
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but  a  large  impact  on  where  in  North  America  they  expand  and 
contract.1° 
A second important question in calculating a measure of the auto dol- 
lar is whether the real auto dollar moves differently from the nominal. 
One familiar way of measuring a real exchange rate is to adjust the nom- 
inal exchange rate for relative national factor costs. Indexes of unit labor 
costs are often employed for this purpose. In focusing on auto competi- 
tiveness, the natural choice might seem to be unit labor costs among 
major producing countries in that sector alone. Yet unit labor costs in all 
manufacturing, not just the auto sector, give an arguably better indicator 
of exogenous factor market pressures on auto producers-pressures  be- 
yond their ability to influence, in the same way as are exchange rate 
pressures. I have chosen this method of cost adjustment below. It is a 
way of detecting how endogenous auto price competitiveness measured 
in section 8.4 corresponds to (arguably) exogenous cost and exchange 
rate pressures measured in this section. My inferences are, of course, 
less meaningful the more insulated or divergent labor cost trends are in 
each country’s auto sector from labor costs in other sectors. 
Figure 8.6 reveals the effect of adjusting the nominal auto dollar for 
manufacturing unit labor costs in  the United States relative to manu- 
facturing unit labor costs in rival automaking countries.  II Fixed weights 
are used in averaging cost trends across Britain, Germany, and Japan 
(Canada excluded), for 1972-76  trade shares as described above. The 
resulting cost-adjusted exchange rate index can be called a measure of 
the real auto dollar, but it is more revealingly a measure of the cost 
competitiveness of the U.S. auto sector. Figure 8.6 shows that there 
is a significant difference between auto cost competitiveness measured 
by the real auto dollar and the contribution that the nominal auto dollar 
alone makes to it. 
Taken together, figures 8.1 through 8.7 reveal some striking obser- 
vations on the effective value of the U.S. dollar for purposes of as- 
sessing U.S. auto competitiveness. 
(1) The nominal auto dollar has been far weaker than  the overall 
nominal dollar ever since 1975, as figure 8.1 reveals. Focusing on nom- 
inal rates alone makes it appear that U.S. automakers were protected 
more by the general weakening of the dollar in the late 1970s than other 
U.S. producers,’* and that  U.S. automakers were penalized  less by 
the general  strengthening of the dollar in the early  1980s than other 
U.S. producers. Indeed, if  exchange rates of the mid-1970s are taken 
as an alignment norm, figure 8.5 shows that the nominal auto dollar 
has been weaker than normal from 1977 to date except from early 1984 
to early 1985. By this norm, the past 15 years’ nominal exchange rates 
have almost all been procompetitive (or protectionist) for U.S.  auto 
firms, and not just those of the late 1970s. 224  J. David Richardson 
Fig. 8.7  Effective  Real  Auto  Dollar  without  Canada and Effective 
Real U.S. Dollar Overall.  = Real Auto Dollar from Figure 
8.6;  A = Effective  Nominal  Value of  U.S. Dollar  Overall, 
from Figure 8.1, adjusted for Manufacturing Unit Labor Costs 
in  U.S.  and Rival Trading Countries, Using Same Weights 
and Base; 100  = March 1973. 
(2) But the account is  quite different for the real auto dollar. The 
cost-adjusted auto dollar of  figure 8.6 tracks the nominal auto dollar 
reasonably closely during the 1970s. Adjusting for trends in unit labor 
costs in the United States and its auto rivals if  anything accentuates 
the procompetitive weakening of  the dollar in this period. During the 
1980s, however, the parallelism between real and nominal measures 
vanishes. The real auto dollar becomes progressively stronger than the 
nominal beginning around 1979. A marked anticompetitive rise in unit 
labor costs in  the United States relative to the (auto-trade-weighted) 
average of unit labor costs in Britain, Germany, and Japan essentially 
eclipses the procompetitive sluggishness with which the nominal auto 
dollar creeps back toward its historical norm.  l3 The result is remarkably 
similar 1980s trajectories for the overall nominal dollar in figure 8.1 
and the real auto dollar in  figure 8.6. In other words,  whatever the 
advantage was that the U.S. auto sector enjoyed in the 1980s relative 
to other U.S. producers from confronting rivals whose currencies fell 
relatively slowly, this advantage was offset by a rapid rise in U.S. unit 
labor costs relative to these same rivals. In fact, it was perhaps more 
than offset, as the next paragraph suggests. 225  Exchange Rates and U.S. Auto Competitiveness 
(3) The real  auto dollar tracks  the overall real  dollar reasonably 
closely during the 1970s, as figure 8.7 reveals. During the 1980s, how- 
ever, the real  auto dollar rose  progressively  more  steeply  than  the 
overall real dollar. So when exchange rates are adjusted for unit labor 
costs relative to principal foreign rivals, the U.S.  auto sector appears 
increasingly  uncompetitive  in  world  markets  relative  to other U .S. 
producers during the  1980s-whereas  unadjusted  nominal  exchange 
rates suggested exactly the ~pposite.'~  Trajectories of the 1980s overall 
dollar and auto dollar have an opposite relation to each other in figure 
8.1 (nominal trends) and figure 8.7 (cost-adjusted trends). 
Exchange rates and factor costs are obviously some of  the most 
important exogenous contributors  to sectoral competitiveness.  I5  We 
turn  in  section 8.4 to two of its most important indicators,  relative 
product prices and market shares.I6 We  see if we can detect any of the 
expected  correlations between relative  prices  or market  shares and 
exchange rates or factor costs. The indicators of auto competitiveness 
I calculate are unique, applying to the three largest integrated North 
American automakers and to their largest three rivals (all Japanese). 
8.4  Price Competitiveness for U.S. Passenger Automobiles 
To  what extent did U.S. auto prices and market shares reflect the 
international cost and exchange rate pressures described above? To 
what extent did they reflect other important changes, such as the Jap- 
anese VRAs? This section attempts an answer by describing measures 
of prices and market shares in the U.S. auto market and assessing their 
covariation with exchange rates, factor costs, and trade policy. Because 
of inadequacies in existing data aggregates (described in section 8.2), 
data were collected and constructed for the six firms with largest recent 
passenger car sales to U.S. buyers. The data were then reaggregated 
with an eye to detecting the covariations of interest. The six largest 
suppliers were General Motors (GM), Ford, Chrysler, Toyota, Nissan, 
and Honda. A data appendix to this paper outlines details for what 
follows, and is available from the author on request. 
8.4.1  Disaggregated Prices by Firm 
The U.S. Department of Commerce regularly publishes data on av- 
erage transaction price per new car, broken down by U.S.  domestic 
sales and imports.I7 Through 1985, the U.S. International Trade Com- 
mission regularly published data on maximum and minimum retail list 
prices  by domestic and foreign automaker.  Remaining retail prices 
are, of course, distributed between the maximum and minimum in a 
way that could be described by a frequency distribution-one  for each 
automaker. By assuming that each automaker has a comparable and 
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maximum and minimum, yet around the relevant average transaction 
price, I have blended the two data sources to obtain a time series of 
average  transactions  price  per  new  car for each of  the  six  largest 
automakers.  I9 
These average transaction prices by firm are plotted in figures 8.8 
and 8.9, normalized so that 1982’s price  = 100. Several features are 
notable. One is that some U.S. firms’ average prices turn down after 
1983, not only because the component price indexes do (e.g., Chrysler’s 
maximum prices), but also because U  .S. automakers’ market share of 
the highest-price models begins to fall off.2o  A second feature is that 
variation across firms in these price trajectories is quite moderate, and 
especially slight for the Japanese firms.21  Third, as a result, there is 
little indication that exchange rates or other exogenous fundamentals 
affect different Japanese firms differently or different  U.S. firms dif- 
ferently. One might have surmised some such differences due, for ex- 
ample, to different multinationality of production among the firms (GM 
and Honda having more multinationality than others). In this regard 
there is only a very slight tendency for GM prices to be more stable 
over the period than Ford or Chrysler prices. 
8.4.2  U.S. and Japanese Auto Price Indexes 
These disaggregated  average  price  indexes  were  then  aggregated 
across firms by nationality to obtain an index of U.S. auto prices and 
Fig. 8.8  U.S. Firms’ Average Normalized  Auto Prices..  = General 
Motors; A = Ford;  = Chrysler; 100 = 1982. 227  Exchange Rates and U.S. Auto Competitiveness 
Fig. 8.9  Japanese Firms’ Average Normalized Auto Prices.  =  Toy- 
ota; A  = Nissan; 0  = Honda; 100 = 1982. 
an index of Japanese auto prices, both measuring average transaction 
prices on sales to U.S. buyers. Each index was a current-period weighted 
average of three firms’ average prices, with weights representing each 
firm’s share of real (constant 1982 dollar) U.S. sales of passenger cars.22 
Figure 8.10 plots the resulting indexes, and figure 8.11 normalizes 
them by the U.S. Consumer Price Index (CPI) for all items. Table 8.1 
records the year-to-year change in the U.S. auto price index relative 
to that for the Japanese firms. Several observations are notable. 
(1)  The  1970s feature auto price  variation  that  is consistent in  a 
straightforward way with the trends in the nominal and cost-adjusted 
exchange rates from  figures 8.1-8.7.  The relative price of  U.S. to 
Japanese autos falls (U.S. price competitiveness improves) as the auto 
dollar declines from 1977 through  1979, and by a roughly comparable 
magnitude. 
(2) The 1980s feature auto price variation that is more complex and 
more interesting. As the nominal and cost-adjusted auto dollar begin 
rising after  1979, U.S. auto price  competitiveness begins to decline 
(with a slight lag) as expected. But it does not continue to decline as 
the dollar continues to rise. On the contrary, U.S.  auto price compet- 
itiveness improves (U.S. auto prices  fall relative to Japanese) from 
1982 through  1985. This improved price competitiveness is especially 
striking in contrast to the deterioration in  U.S. cost competitiveness 
suggested by the real exchange rates of figures 8.6  and 8.7. The contrast 228  J. David Richardson 
Fig. 8.10  Average Normalized Auto Prices of U.S. Firms and Japanese 
Firms.  w  = U.S. Firms; A = Japanese Firms; 100 = 1982. 
Fig. 8.11  Average Normalized Auto Prices of U.S. Firms and Japanese 
Firms  Relative  to U.S.  Consumer Price  Index.  w  = U.S. 
Firms; A = Japanese Firms; 100 = 1982. 229  Exchange Rates and U.S. Auto Competitiveness 
Table 8.1  Changes in Big-Three U.S. Auto Prices Relative to Big-Three 
Japanese Auto Prices (Percentage Change in Aggregate 
Normalized Price index) 
Period  Percentage Change 
1977 over 1976 
1978 over 1977 
1979 over 1978 
1980 over 1979 
1981 over 1980 
1982 over 1981 
1983 over 1982 
1984 over 1983 
1985 over 1984 
10.29 
-  13.12 




-  1.73 
-3.14 
-3.59 
Source: Data underlying figure 8.10 or 8.1 1. 
Notes:  U.S. big three are General Motors, Ford, Chrysler. Japanese big three are Toyota, 
Nissan, Honda. 
between price and cost competitiveness hints at either a profit squeeze 
among U.S. automakers or a profit surge among their foreign rivals on 
sales in the U.S. market. 
(3) The Japanese VRAs and oligopolistic auto market structure are 
ingredients that give these trends explanation and coherence. Trends 
in cost competitiveness and price competitiveness need not be parallel 
when abnormal profits can persist due to entry barriers. Since a VRA 
pressures Japanese suppliers to raise their prices relative to U.S. au- 
tomakers, its effects counteract the opposing pressures from the stronger 
dollar and rising U.S.  labor costs. Indeed, U.S. auto price competi- 
tiveness begins improving around the time the VRAs are first imposed 
(spring 1981),  and relative U.S.-to-Japanese auto prices end up in 1985 
at roughly the same level as in  1980. 
(4) Figure 8.11 shows how both auto price indexes begin rising rel- 
ative to other prices, as measured by the CPI, around the time that the 
VRAs are imposed. This also is a familiar effect of a sectoral trade 
barrier, in  contrast to exchange rates and labor costs, which should 
probably  not  be  expected to produce  strong effects on auto prices 
relative to other prices. 
(5) Figure 8.12 sheds interesting light  on the possible  benefits  to 
Japanese automakers of developments in the U.S. auto market, sugges- 
tive of  surging profits. It converts the dollar price index of Japanese 
sales in the United States into yen (using the corresponding yen-dollar 
exchange rate), and compares the implied yen price received to other 
Japanese prices,  measured by their GNP deflator. The yen price of 
autos exported to the  United  States rises  steeply and  continuously 
from 1978 on, relative to other Japanese goods, signaling either real- 230  J. David Richardson 
location of production and resources toward U.S. activities in the Jap- 
anese auto sector, in a competitive model, or rising profitability if there 
are entry barriers. 
8.4.3  Real Auto Sales and Market Shares 
One of  the products of the disaggregation described above is an ability 
to refine aggregate measures of auto sales volume, real market shares, 
and quantitative indexes. Instead of simply adding together units sold, 
as is the custom in many tabulations and studies, I weighted each firm’s 
unit sales by its average 1982 price and developed a time series for each 
firm of real (constant 1982 dollar) sales.23  These were then aggregated 
to obtain a measure of real Japanese and U.S. big-three auto sales in the 
United States, along with corresponding market shares which are often 
interpreted as ex post indicators of competitiveness. 
Figure 8.13 shows how the U.S.  market shares of the big-three Jap- 
anese suppliers (Toyota, Nissan, Honda) vary over time if  measured 
in  units  and  if  measured  in  real  terms.  The real  market  shares lie 
uniformly below the shares of units, because  1982 prices of Japanese 
autos were below their U.S. equivalents. The covariation in the series 231  Exchange Rates and U.S. Auto Competitiveness 
Fig. 8.13  Japanese Firms’ Share of  Real Auto  Sales and Units Sold 
by Largest Six Firms.  A = Share of  Units Sold;  = Share 
of  Real Sales. 
over time, though, is very strong. For this period, indexes of real change 
and measures of growth are not much affected by choosing simple or 
more refined aggregation of quantities. If there had been sharper changes 
in average prices across Japanese firms, there would have been less 
covariation in the two series in figure 8.13. 
Figure 8.14 shows how mild  recent variation has been in the real 
shares of the six principal auto suppliers in their own summed sales.24 
It also suggests only modest covariation with the exchange rate and 
cost pressures described above. The Japanese incursions of the late 
1970s came in  spite of  adverse trends in  exchange rates and at the 
expense of Ford and Chrysler. Ford’s and Chrysler’s gradual rebound 
in  the  1980s came at the expense of  all  other firms except Honda, 
whose market share continued to rise gradually, as might be expected 
in light of Honda’s 1982 entry into U.S. production facilities that al- 
lowed it to avoid the full impact of the Japanese VRAs. Controlling 
for Honda’s unique situation, there is some suggestion of the expected 
negative covariation between firm-by-firm price competitiveness from 
figures 8.8 and 8.9 and market shares from figure 8.14. 
8.5  Conclusion 
Trends in U.S. automakers’ competitiveness relative to foreign ri- 
vals, especially as measured by relative prices, seem reasonably con- 
sistent from 1976 through  1985 with trends in exchange rates, relative 232  J. David Richardson 
Fig. 8.14  Firm  Shares  of  Real  Auto  Sales  of  Largest  Six  Firms. 
o  = General Motors; A  = Ford; o  = Chrysler A =  Toyota; 
= Nissan;.  = Honda. 
labor costs, and U.S. trade  policy. Table 8.2 summarizes how  auto 
price  competitiveness might be  very  roughly  decomposed over this 
period, as described above. A  sensible agenda for ongoing research 
along these lines would focus on measurement  of  trends in  quality, 
product mix, and market share, largely ignored above, and on more 
subtly conditioned covariations and explanations. 
Notes 
1. Such studies include Bryan and Humpage (1984), Citrin (1985), Collyns 
and  Dunaway  (1987), Crandall  (1984, 1985,  1987), Dinopoulos  and  Kreinin 
(1987), Dixit (1986), Feenstra (I984,1985a, 1985b, 1986a, 1986b),  Gomez-Ibanez 
and Harrison (1982), Gomez-Ibanez et al. (1983), Hickok (1985), Kaplan (1986), 
Lambson and Richardson (1987), Levinsohn  (1987), Mannering and Winston 
(1987), Tarr and Morkre (1984), and USITC (1985a). 
2. See, for example, Branson and Love (1986), Day (1985), and Schwartz 
(1985). 
3.  For  example, the imported auto price  series from the U.S.  Bureau  of 
Labor Statistics (BLS) does not seem to exist in published form prior to 1980. 
In the U.S. Commerce Department’s Survey of  Current Business, for further 
example, the price deflator for passenger car imports is calculated to follow 
the BLS 1980-011 series for non-Canadian imports and to follow the U.S. pro- 233  Exchange Rates and U.S. Auto Competitiveness 
Table 8.2  Rough Summary of Auto Trends during Sub-periods 
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C"Residua1  impulse"  denotes pressure on relative auto prices that is unaccounted for 
by exchange rates and labor costs and is defined by subtracting the first two rows of the 
table from the last. It includes VRAs, quality, product mix, etc. 
dThat is, impulses that tended to raise prices of Japanese automakers relative to their 
U.S.  rivals. 
ducer price index for Canadian imports; and price deflators for purchases of 
new domestic autos and for purchases of  new imports are identical to each 
other and made to follow the U.S. CPI for new cars. 
4.  For example, the Commerce Department's constant-dollar  auto series in 
the Survey of  Current Business come from deflating current-dollar purchases 
of imports by an index measuring both import prices and domestic prices and 
from  deflating  current-dollar  domestic purchases by  the same mixed-breed 
index. 
5. Weights that are shares of world trade, rather than focus-country trade, 
are sometimes recommended when there is export competition in third-country 
markets as well as import competition at home. For illustration, see Feldstein 
and Bacchetta (1987), Pads and Helkie (1987),  and Pauls (1987).  US.  trade 
weights are used here because U.S. passenger car exports, except to Canada, 
are quite small. 
6.  See Ott (1987)  or Hervey and Strauss (1987) for a general discussion of 
these issues. 
7. The 1972-76  weights were (numerators represent shares of total U.S. car 
imports) 
British pound  0.03l0.94 
Canadian dollar  0.40/0.94 
German mark  0.2610.94 
Japanese yen  0.2510.94 
Sum of four  0.9410.94. 234  J. David Richardson 
8. The 1980 I and I1 weights were 
British pound  0.02010.  932 
Canadian dollar  0.21 110.932 
German mark  0.23310.932 
Japanese yen  0.46810.932 
Sum of four  0.93210.932. 
9. The undulating path of effective exchange rates during this period  may 
help explain the invariance of the trajectories to the choice of fixed and current 
weights. Fixed-weight (Laspeyre’s) indexes overstate inflation but understate 
deflation; current-weight (Paasche) indexes understate inflation but overstate 
deflation.  Over an undulating price path the biases offset each other within 
each weighting system. 
10. The Canadian share of North American passenger cars (units) produced 
by GM, Ford, and Chrysler averaged 9.8% in  1976-78  and  11.5% in  1979- 
85-after  the Canadian competitiveness edge developed. 
11. I am indebted to Dick Marston for sharing with me the data necessary 
to do these calculations and, more importantly, the benefits of his insights on 
what they imply.  The unit labor cost series are national-currency  indexes of 
compensation of employees per unit of real output (in the value-added  sense) 
in the manufacturing sector. 
12. This seems likely to be true with respect to the weakening of the dollar 
from 1985 to 1987, too, concentrated as it was on yen and marks. 
13. The eclipse would be only partial if the U.S. measure of unit labor costs 
had been drawn from the auto sector alone, not from overall U.S. manufac- 
turing.  Wage givebacks and technological  developments of  the early  1980s 
caused unit labor costs in autos to rise somewhat more slowly than in other 
U.S. manufacturing (Collyns and Dunaway 1987, p. 154). With similar inter- 
sectoral  divergence in Britain, Germany, and Japan, however, the eclipse would 
be restored, since nation-to-nation relative unit labor costs would move com- 
parably for autos and overall manufacturing. 
14. The measures and weights employed allowed a broader conclusion. Every 
U.S. sector whose dominant rivals were Germany andlor Japan appeared in- 
creasingly uncompetitive in world markets relative to other U .S. sectors during 
the 1980s. Obviously, though, these conclusions might (or might not) be mod- 
erated by employing sectoral unit labor costs, as discussed in note 13. 
15. Another factor that plays an  important role in section 8.4 is border trade 
policy, specifically the VRAs with Japan. 
16. Quality  is  a third  important contributor to sectoral competitiveness, 
although it is largely an endogenous choice of automakers. Quality will usually 
be reflected in price as well as  in inherent product characteristics. Disentangling 
the price influence of trends in relative quality and in relative competitiveness 
is discussed in more detail by Feenstra (1984) and Collyns and Dunaway (1987), 
among others. 
17. See tabulations of these data in MVMA (1986, p. 38) and Kaplan (1986, 
table 2). 
18. The last and most recent of its compilations is USITC (1986b). The price 
series have some interest in their own right. For example, the minimum-price 
series show very little divergence around trend or dispersion across firms, and 
especially little for the Japanese firms. The maximum-price  series, by com- 
parison, show much more divergence and dispersion, especially for the U.S. 
firms. 235  Exchange Rates and U.S. Auto Competitiveness 
19. An obvious objection to this procedure is that percentage discounts on 
autos with high list prices are probably larger than on  autos with low list prices. 
20. Calculated  Japanese market shares of these highest-price  models  rise 
from  1984 to 1985, but European market shares rise even more sharply. 
21. This could be due, of course, either to competitive pressures or  to implicit 
price parallelism among oligopolistic firms. 
22. The Japanese and US.  price indexes are implicit price deflators, and the 
real  sales data, compared  below  to simple  aggregates of  units  sold, record 
annual sales valued at 1982 prices. 
23. Collyns and Dunaway (1987) is a noteworthy, although fairly primitive, 
exception. 
24.  In total  U.S.  market  sales, however,  real  shares of  smaller suppliers, 
both European and Japanese, began rising in  1984. 
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COmn’leIlt  Robert Lawrence 
Anyone attempting to  explain  the behavior  of  the U.S. automobile 
market in the 1980s is unusually brave. For the eighties have seen major 
Robert Lawrence is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. 238  J. David Richardson 
shocks, each of  which probably altered the behavioral parameters of 
the market in a fundamental way. Consumers shifted demand toward 
Japanese cars, both because they were burned by the second oil shock, 
which convinced them to shift to smaller cars, and because they per- 
ceived Japanese automobiles to be  of  superior quality.  In  addition, 
contributing to the turmoil were voluntary export restraints, currency 
fluctuations, and toward the end of the period, the arrival of the trans- 
plants-Japanese  automakers operating assembly plants in the United 
States. In this paper, David Richardson takes a first cut at trying to 
understand U.S. auto competitiveness by answering three questions: 
(1)  what is the exchange rate measure relevant for U.S. automotive 
competitiveness? (2) what is the price series relevant for deflating nom- 
inal U.S.  automobile aggregates? and (3) what have been the effects 
of VRAs and exchange rates on price competitiveness? 
In my  comments, I’d like first to discuss his answers to these ques- 
tions and then to make a few comments of my  own about the effects 
of VRAs. 
Dave argues that conventional multilateral or bilateral exchange rate 
measures are inappropriate for analyzing U.  S. automobile competi- 
tiveness. One issue is whether “U.S.”  includes the profits earned by 
U.S. firms in  their overseas operations or refers only to operations 
within the geographic boundaries of the United States. He decides that 
North America is the appropriate focus and proceeds to drop the Ca- 
nadian dollar from his exchange rate measure. I feel the U.S. domestic 
industry would be a more pertinent focus, particularly since employ- 
ment considerations are often a key issue in  discussions about com- 
petitiveness. But even taking his focus as given, I am not sure he has 
the correct indicator. If one wants a measure relevant for profitability, 
why not include consideration of United States-owned corporations in 
Europe and other parts of the world? The Ford Motor Company, for 
example, was kept solvent by its European operations during this pe- 
riod. I am also unclear why, given his purpose, Dave uses U.S. import 
weights and thus neglects to take account of competition between U.S. 
and foreign automobiles in Canada. Indeed, if  the objective is really 
to capture the impact of exchange rates on profitability, I am not sure 
that any simple weighting scheme will suffice. It will probably be nec- 
essary to obtain weights from a fully specified econometric model of 
such profit determinaion (much as the International Monetary Fund 
uses a trade model in the construction of its multilateral exchange rate 
measures). 
The major finding in the analysis of the automotive exchange rate is 
that, compared to other U.S. producers, in the 1970s U.S. automakers 
were helped more, and in the 1980s penalized less, by exchange rate 
shifts. But surely the real, rather than nominal, exchange rate is rel- 239  Exchange Rates and U.S. Auto Competitiveness 
evant for such analysis. Since Japanese and German inflation have been 
much lower than U.S. inflation, I am not sure this conclusion would 
hold up. 
Dave then turns to construct his own price measures. In general, I 
agree that the deflators for automobiles are highly questionable. For 
example, the official data treat government-mandated regulatory changes 
as if  they were improvements in quality. If  consumers don’t have the 
same views of these changes, they will be inadequate for explaining 
behavior. In addition, the measures fail to capture actual transactions 
prices and the implicit price equivalent of financing. 
I am sympathetic to Dave’s desire to construct a better price mea- 
sure, but I have some problems with his. I find it peculiar that he should 
deliberately construct a quantity measure which is sensitive to shifts 
in product mix. As Bob Feenstra has shown, VRAs not only led to 
higher Japanese prices on given models but also influenced the product 
mix by inducing options loading and shifts towards larger cars. For 
tracking price competitiveness, I think we need to examine the same 
products over time. 
The analysis of the impact of VRAs and exchange rates does not use 
an explicit empirical model. Instead, Dave prefers eyeball economet- 
rics. Now I applaud anyone who examines the data closely before using 
it, but I do not think one can make ceteris paribus statements about 
cause and effect without controlling for other factors. This is partic- 
ularly the case when there is strong reason to believe, as I described 
at the start of these comments, that major influences have not remained 
constant. 
Dave concludes that VRAs had little impact on U.S. relative price 
competitiveness.  First, it should  be  emphasized that this is not the 
same as saying they had no effect-domestic  and imported auto prices 
might have risen by the same amount. Second, his analysis leans heavily 
on the 1982 data. Auto demand was particularly weak when the VRAs 
were introduced. As the studies of Crandall suggest, their impact might 
have  been  more  important  in  subsequent  years  when  demand  re- 
covered. But for disentangling  such effects, a model  is essential.  I 
should note that Dave’s conclusion differs from that obtained by others 
who have used explicit models. More work needs to be done to explain 
why these findings differ from those in the literature. 
Finally, I am not sure that prices are the key issue in auto compet- 
itiveness. There could be very important effects from exchange rates, 
even if prices are similar, if profitability is very different. Indeed, much 
of the debate about the competitiveness of U.S. autos pertains to the 
alleged $2,000 difference in production costs between Japan and the 
United States. A key issue currently is whether, as a result of the recent 
yen  appreciation,  that gap  has  been  eliminated. Clifford Winston’s 240  J. David Richardson 
work-and  the planned  increase in Japanese assembly operations in 
the United States-seem  to signal that it has. 
I  believe that VRAs are particularly counterproductive policies- 
even when viewed narrowly from the standpoint of protectionists who 
supported them and other forms of quota protection. Allegedly  pro- 
tection was required to save jobs and permit the industry to restore its 
competitiveness. Generally when people talk about saving jobs, they 
mean those of the workers currently employed, and they refer to the 
competitiveness of the firms currently in  the industry.  In theory, of 
course, if  a quota enhances domestic monopoly power, it could lead 
protected firms to so raise prices and thus lower output that on balance 
jobs could be lost rather than saved. In fact, the work of Winston finds 
that the VRAs actually cost auto  jobs, since the effect, inducing buyers 
to switch from Japanese to U.S. automobiles, was less than the effect 
of higher auto prices on sales by U.S.-based firms. 
It is also not clear that VRAs had  very beneficial  effects  on the 
competitiveness of U.S. automobile firms. While VRAs may have en- 
hanced the profitability of U.S. automotive firms, they also raised the 
profits of their competitors in both Japan and Europe. Moreover, U.S. 
investment in the auto industry in the early 1980s was below investment 
in the late 1970s. In addition, as  Crandall shows in his recent Brookings 
paper, compensation in the automobile industry today retains the same 
relationship to average compensation in manufacturing as it had in the 
late 1970s. 
But in one sense VRAs may have indeed contributed to the corn- 
petitiveness  of firms based in the United  States, if  not to the U.S.- 
owned firms themselves. They speeded the introduction of Japanese 
transplants. One of the issues in this conference has been the degree 
to which the strong dollar has led to hysteresis. If  it has, the dollar 
may have to depreciate by more than it appreciated to obtain the same 
current account level. But, partly because of VRAs, the auto industry 
could be a case on the other side. Our industrial potential in autos may 
have increased during this period. There is now talk that some of the 
Japanese transplants, brought here by fears of protection, may actually 
begin exporting from the United States-perhaps  even back to Japan. 